Taking the cue from the controversial speech of Pope Benedict XVI at the University of Re- 
A public sphere formally devoid of all nonsecular sources of moral and ethical judgement is quite defenceless against substantive ethical claims; it has only proceduralism to fall back on, and thus cannot deliver compelling judgements about, or even interpret the meanings of, a polity's thorniest ethical or political dilemmas. Once nation-state sovereignty itself begins to fray […] public discourse becomes more vulnerable to subnational or transnational identity claims (ethnic, racial, sexual, religious) […] [and] a range of social movements fill the public sphere with noisy demands and complaints, including reactionary, antimodernist ones. The commitment of liberalism to a public sphere uncontaminated by non-liberal moral discourses, whether explicitly religious or not, paradoxically makes it vulnerable […] to the claims of fundamentalist or essentialist identity-based social movements. 
Introduction
What kind of political reading can be made of Pope Benedict XVI's address at the University of Regensburg in September 2006 which led to widespread protests in the Muslim world?
This broad question is taken as the starting point of a specific line of inquiry that considers Benedict's remarks on Islam and Europe not simply as the expression of a theological perspective, but of a political void created by Europe's nominal proceduralism in relation to the question of European identity. The term 'Europe,' in this case, designates not just a set of institutions, ranging from the European Union to other political actors at national and supranational level, but a social imaginary, a system of meanings and expectations 2 that "underpin [s] the creation and reproduction of [these] institutions and the organization of solidarity." 3 It is contended that the social imaginary of Europe on the vast set of issues related to the question of European identity has been primarily shaped by a nominal proceduralism: a political approach that promotes a system of communal allegiances based on the acceptance of and compliance with universally shared principles. This approach can be observed in relation to the politics of enlargement, with membership granted upon fulfilment of the acquis communautaire, as well as in the debate on Islam in Europe, with integration mostly conceived as Muslim acquiescence with the norms of European secularity.
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European proceduralism is the attempt to overcome a painful past of religious and national sectarianism and can thus be described, following Etienne Balibar, as the endeavour to shape "a new society, and a new civilizational pattern […] by rearranging the elements inher-2 For Charles Taylor a social imaginary is how "people imagine their social existence, how they fit together with others, how things go on between them and their fellows, the expectations that are normally met, and the deeper normative notions and images that underlie these expectations." Charles Taylor the past. According to Danièle Hervieu-Léger, selective memory should not necessarily be resented as it contributes to the symbolic production of norms and values which make for a shared worldview. 9 The risk, however, is that of institutionalising a self-absolving narrative whereby Europe, in its politics of identity and difference, appears to have definitively transcended the elements of ethnicity, nationality, or religion which made its past so violent. Proceduralism, in fact, makes the politics of identity/difference merely a question of compliance with the universal principles of human rights, democracy, and the rule of law. However, it will be shown that the proceduralism of Europe has often been only nominal and therefore, in key moments of the definition of the idea of Europe, elements of kinship based on alleged civilisational or religious ties have been privileged over universalist narratives.
Taken together, these two arguments suggest that the nominal proceduralism of Europe is not only politically counterproductive as it favours the re-emergence of reactionary forces, such as that of sectors of the Catholic establishment that, with Benedict XVI, propound an essentialist understanding of Europe revolving around Christianity which stigmatises Islam as 'the Other.' European nominal proceduralism is also ambiguous because while practicing a communitarian politics of demarcation between members and strangers, it vindicates a universally rule-based politics that places the burden of exclusion automatically on the excluded. This externalisation of responsibility has been an important dimension of the nu- The Polish pope put at the centre of his pontificate a double commitment: bringing "Europe back into the center of the Church's concern" 30 and strengthening the transnational role of the Catholic Church in "international conflict and in issues dealing with world peace." 31 As for the previous popes, the politics of John Paul II was greatly influenced by the interaction with the worldly regime. However, unlike Pious XII and Paul VI who somehow adjusted their positions to the dictates of secular politics, John Paul II also exercised a proactive role in fostering political change. Tirelessly campaigning against the logic of the blocs, he acted as the "first citizen of the emerging global civil society" 32 when appealing directly to the masses in Poland and other Eastern European countries, gathering huge crowds and summoning them on human rights and religious freedom. 33 Yet, John Paul II appealed also to the secular regime "as early as in 1988" when, in a famous address at the European Parliament, "he called for Eastern enlargement so that the whole continent might again 'breathe with both 28 Hehir, "The Old Church," 104. 29 Hehir, "The Old Church," 104-105. 30 Ibid. 31 Casanova, "Globalizing Catholicism," 125. 32 Casanova, "Globalizing Catholicism," 131.
33 Philpott & Shah, "Faith, " 42. lungs.'" 34 Although determined to pursue a re-evangelisation of Europe and vocal in calling for a recovery of the European "Christian memory and heritage," a patrimony that he believed had been squandered "in an atmosphere poisoned by secularism and dominated by consumerism," 35 John Paul II was also very careful in not making the Christian identity of Europe as source of exclusion and divisiveness.
Having experienced the end of the Iron Curtain but also the disillusionment that followed with the spread of ethnic and national conflicts, Karol Wojtyla was particularly concerned with the possibility of a 'clash of civilisation' 36 and thus considered it his particular duty to strive to dismantle boundaries between faiths and peoples. Overall, however, it can be argued that the worldly regime of Europe has seemingly privileged an instrumental/procedural understanding of Europe with the avowed ambition of securing greater room for diversity. Hence, the EU has decided not to include any reference to the Christian roots of Europe, but only a general mention of its religious heritage; the official approach to enlargement is claimed to be based on universally valid principles 49 (which make appear the debate on whether or not Turkey 'belongs' to Europe a cultural speculation with limited political relevance); and finally, the issue of Muslim integration has often been con- the European historical experience. It is the attempt to deflate those sources of communal identification that in the past have engendered fragmentation and conflict.
The problem of this approach, however, is that it is unable to account for the multifac- In evoking a tension between reason and Islam (whose subjects appears uncritically prone to submit to the will of a capricious God), the pope is drawing on a secular tradition of Oriental-ism which denies to Islam the "search for a hidden truth" and thus "the capability of engaging in a process of subjectivity-formation. to be strengthened, as it is the only barrier against an unconditioned opening towards other cultures that, as Ratzinger sees it, can lead to dangerous forms of moral relativism.
Interestingly, the nominal proceduralism of Europe that has made political room for Benedict's stances also vindicates a European exceptionalism. In this case, however, the exceptional nature of Europe rests on its being the only polity that, guided exclusively by the universal principles of reason and rationality, can transcend the divisiveness engendered by primordial elements such as ethnicity, nationality, or religion. This belief is the second, crucial, limitation of proceduralism. It rests on a selective reconstruction of the past that obliterates events in which elements of alleged civilisational commonality and historical affinity have been given priority over universal, rule-based, principles. This belief, however, is decisive for endowing Europe with a higher moral authority-an authority that allows Europe to place the burden of exclusion automatically on the excluded without questioning its own assumptions and behaviours.
In this respect, it can be useful to consider two important moments in the definition of the idea of Europe: its birth and the 2004 enlargement. It will be shown how a reading of these events solely through the grand-narratives of 'integration' and 'inclusion' 56 does not simply overlook the role of interests and political calculations, but neglects important dimensions of conceptual and physical exclusion postulated upon a deeply entrenched social imaginary of Europe as a moral geography whose boundaries are not simply rule-based, but draw on a blend of cultural, religious and civilisational dimensions.
Procedural Europe
In a 1992 article, "The Past is Another Country: Myth and Memory in Postwar Europe," Tony Judt powerfully argues that for the peoples of Europe the process of European integration has served the purpose of obliterating the shameful memories of collaboration with the Nazi regime and of other violence carried out in the name of nationalist ideologies. As he recalls:
Woodrow Wilson and the Treaties of Versailles notwithstanding, the 60 million people living under an "alien" jurisdiction in 1914 had not all achieved self-determination after World War I: there were still some 25 million persons living in "someone else's state." The Nazi occupation had gone some way to resolving this perennial European problem by killing most of the Jews and some of the smallest stateless groups [Roma among others]. After the war, the liberated states took the occasion to further this process by removing the Germans themselves.
[…] Others felt free to indulge in further exercises of ethnic purification.
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According to Judt, the "further exercises of ethnic purification" were made possible by the oblivion which characterised the years immediately after World War II. 58 The rushing desire to overcome these tragic memories by fostering a 'Euro-cant' of peace, stability and unity was built upon a politics of responsibility which made Germany the supreme and almost only culpable for the tragedies of World War II. This 'myth' ignored the crucial fact that:
The Nazis could certainly never have sustained their hegemony over most of the continent as long as they did […] [had not] most of occupied Europe either collaborated with the occupying forces (a minority) or accepted with resignation and equanimity the presence and activities of the German forces (a majority).
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For Judt, the unwillingness of European nations to recognise their responsibilities in the Nazi regime and the adoption of the status of victims of external ferocity was partly necessary to tacitly considered in the general category of those who had been persecuted by the Nazi regime and thus put on a par with the persecuted nationals of these countries. This in turn cleared these nations from any charges of cooperation with the Nazi regime in persecuting Jews.
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More generally, this double moral vocabulary allowed Europe to purge itself of its responsibilities without undergoing a serious reflection on both its anti-Semitic and nationalistic tendencies. This sanitising process has been vigorously undertaken through the process of European integration which has promoted an idea of Europe as a space of peace, democracy, and solidarity. However, undigested memories from a past that Europe had tried frantically to suppress have started to make their comeback: this is how Judt interprets the electoral success of the nationalistic and xenophobic far right in Europe, from Jean-Marie Le Pen to Jörg
Haider, at the beginning of the 1990s. However, there is more than that.
For Judt, writing in 1992, the legacy of these memories not only casts a shadow on the cohesion of the then EU 15, but also on the very possibility of enlargement to the then coun-tries of Eastern Europe. He suggested that the idea of Europe-and the related process of European integration-was also possible because of "the Soviet grip on Eastern Europe." It "had the double virtue of keeping the region away from the prosperous West, while at the same time allowing the latter the luxury of lamenting the very circumstances from which it was benefiting." 63 Western Europe-the European Union-felt little responsibility to actively campaign to tear down this divide. Judt recalls the support of the western left for the communist regimes and how some of its exponents described the Perestroika as a missed opportunity for the renewal of the communist project; or the "lack of enthusiasm displayed by
French and other statesman at the fall of the Wall and its consequences. Two elements of Judt's account are particularly relevant for our purposes: firstly, the idea that a united Europe is a project born out of the necessity of obliterating the memories of violence of World War II; secondly, the fact that this very genesis, the obliteration of memory, leaves this project "built on sand" and thus casts a shadow on its future developments, particularly the possibility of an eastern enlargement. These arguments raise two important sets of questions: firstly, what are the implications of conceiving the European project as one born out of the attempt to overcome past memories of violence, and thus not moved primarily by elements of communal identification? Secondly, how can we interpret the fact that an enlargement that in 1992 appeared deeply problematic was, slightly more than ten years later, a political reality?
The creation of a community among entities that had been fighting each other for centuries suggests a universal project-a project based not on shared blood, ethnicity, or religion, but on a universal aim, peace, and universal principles, such as democracy, justice, and tolerance. This universal narrative, which, in slightly different guises, accounts for one of the most revered meanings of the idea of a united Europe and is one of the pillars of its procedural selfunderstanding, is nonetheless postulated upon an implicit exclusion. Taking The memories of injustices committed in Europe, albeit fragmented and partially distorted, are the selective memories mentioned by Hervieu-Léger in our introduction: memories that mould contemporary dimensions of European being and solidarity and contribute to shape a shared European worldview, but that obliterate another history of European violence, linked to the process of decolonisation. According to Peo Hansen, "the most canonized frame of reference in the literature on integration theory and the historical evolution of today's European Union" usually includes four elements, two internal-the devastation of two world wars and the nationalist rivalries in Europe-and two external-the role of the United States and the Cold War. 68 It is a strange omission, he continues, that this framework does not take into account post-colonialism since "the early stages of European integration would also coincide with the dismantling of another world order." 69 This omission, he suggests, is not fortuitous but is related to the "European Union's own conception of its historical trajectory and
[…] how the EU employs these conceptions of history in its current endeavour to foster and disseminate a sense of 'European identity' in the Union." 70 Hansen's main contention is that the notion of European identity as based on peace, human rights, solidarity, and widening circles of identification, is postulated upon the exclusion of a whole series of "atrocities, wars and structures of exploitation" directly linked to colonialism and decolonisation. 69 Hansen, "European Integration," 484. 70 Hansen, "European Integration," 485. According to Helene Sjursen, although "[t] he EU claims that the rules that govern the enlargement process are not just 'specially preferred', but rely on universally valid princi- the communist dictatorships, with the result that these countries have 'acquired' differences.
These differences, however, can be 'eliminated' as long as Western Europe supports these countries in their process of transition. The same argument cannot be made in the case of Turkey, for which a dimension of 'inherent' difference ('civilisational,' in the terms of this paper) sheds an aura of doubt on whether, European efforts notwithstanding, this country can really become part of Europe. 75 Sjursen, "Why Expand?," 505-506. 76 Sjursen, "Why Expand?," 508. 77 Sjursen, "Why Expand?," 491. 78 Sjursen, "Why Expand?," 505. This image, powerful as a literary figure, appears more elusive in terms of political implementation. Whatever the hurdles though, this project deserves every effort. The brief exploration of Papal diplomacy with regards to Europe has in fact suggested a correspondence between events in the religious regime and the worldly regime. Thus, whereas the religious regime moved from the logic of the blocs of Pius XII, to the proactive 'inclusiveness' of John Paul II via the Ostpolitik of Paul VI, the worldly regime of Europe was undertaking a process of "cosmopolitan Europeanization" expanding "its territorial borders through the integration 87 Difficulties, to be sure, to which Muslim themselves have contributed. 88 Balibar, "Europe," 334. 89 Ibid. 90 Balibar, "Europe," 335.
